Why Does a Belief Need Justification in Order to Count as Knowledge Review
Overview – The Definition of Knowledge
The definition of knowledge is one of the oldest questions of philosophy. Plato's respond, that cognition is justified true belief, stood for thousands of years – until a 1963 philosophy paper past philosopher Edmund Gettier challenged this definition.
Gettier described two scenarios – now known every bit Gettier cases – where an individual has a justified true conventionalities but that is non knowledge.
Since Gettier's challenge to the justified true belief definition, diverse alternative accounts of knowledge accept been proposed. The goal of these accounts is to define 'knowledge' in a way that rules out Gettier cases whilst still capturing all instances of what we consider to be knowledge.
A Level philosophy looks at v definitions of knowledge:
- Justified true belief (the tripartite definition)
- JTB + No faux lemmas
- Reliabilism
- Virtue epistemology
- Infallibilism
It's of import to starting time distinguish the kind of knowledge we're discussing here. Broadly, in that location are three kinds of knowledge:
- Ability: knowledge how – east.g. "I know how to ride a bike"
- Acquaintance: knowledge of – e.g. "I know Fred well"
- Propositional: cognition that – eastward.k. "I know that London is the uppercase of England"
When we talk about the definition of knowledge, we are talking about the definition of propositional knowledge specifically.
Justified Truthful Belief
The tripartite definition
In Theaetetus, Plato argues knowledge is "true conventionalities accompanied by a rational account", which gets simplified to:
- Justified
- True
- Conventionalities
'Justified true belief' is known as the tripartite definition of cognition.
Necessary and sufficient conditions
Each of the three conditions above are taken to exist necessary for knowledge.
For example, yous can't know something if it isn't truthful. If someone said, "I know that the moon is made of green cheese" you wouldn't consider that knowledge because it isn't true.
Similarly, you can't know something you don't believe. Information technology just wouldn't make sense, for example, to say "I know today is Monday but I don't believe today is Monday."
And finally, justification. Suppose someone asks y'all if you know how many moons Pluto has. You take no interest in astronomy but only have a strong feeling most the number 5 because it's your lucky number or whatever. You'd be right – Pluto does indeed accept 5 moons – but information technology seems a bit of a stretch to say yous knew Pluto has 5 moons. Your true belief "Pluto has 5 moons" is non properly justified so would non count as knowledge.
Together, these necessary conditions (justified, true, and conventionalities) are said to be jointly sufficient. This means they capture every instance of knowledge whilst not capturing annihilation that isn't knowledge. This latter role is what Gettier cases challenge.
Problem: Gettier cases
Gettier's paper describes 2 scenarios where an individual has a justified truthful belief that is non knowledge. Both examples describe a belief that fails to count as noesis because the justified conventionalities is but true as a result of luck.
Gettier case 1
- Smith and Jones are interviewing for the same chore
- Smith hears the interviewer say "I'm going to give Jones the chore"
- Smith as well sees Jones count 10 coins from his pocket
- Smith thus forms the belief that "the human being who will become the job has 10 coins in his pocket"
- Merely Smith gets the job, not Jones
- And, past coincidence, Smith likewise has 10 coins in his pocket
Smith'south belief "the human who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket" is:
- Justified: he hears the interviewer say Jones will get the job and he sees that Jones has ten coins in his pocket
- True: the human who gets the task (Smith) does indeed have x coins in his pocket
But despite being a justified truthful belief, we do non desire to say that Smith's belief counts equally knowledge because it's only luck that led to him being right.
This shows that the tripartite definition of knowledge is non sufficient.
Gettier example 2
Gettier's 2d example relies on the logical principle of disjunction introduction.
Disjunction introduction says that if you have a true statement and add "or some other argument" so the full statement (i.e. "true statement or some other statement") is likewise true.
For case: "London is the capital of England" is true. Then the statement "either London is the capital of England or the moon is made of light-green cheese" is also true, because London is the capital letter of England. Even though the 2d role ("the moon is fabricated of greenish cheese") is false, the overall argument is true because the or means only one role has to be truthful (in this case "London is the majuscule of England").
Gettier'south 2d example is every bit follows:
- Smith has a justified belief that "Jones owns a Ford"
- So, using the principle of disjunctive introduction above, Smith can form the further justified conventionalities that "Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona"
- Smith thinks his conventionalities that "Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" is truthful because the first condition is true (i.e. that Jones owns a Ford)
- Simply information technology turns out that Jones does not own a Ford
- However, by sheer coincidence, Brown is in Barcelona
So, Smith's belief that "Either Jones owns a Ford or Brownish is in Barcelona" is:
- True: "Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" turns out to exist true. But Smith thought information technology was true because of the first condition (Jones owns a Ford) whereas it turns out it is true because of the second status (Brown is in Barcelona)
- Justified: The original belief "Jones owns a Ford" is justified, and so disjunction introduction means that the 2d belief "Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" is besides justified.
Simply despite being a justified true belief, information technology is wrong to say that Smith'southward belief counts every bit knowledge, because it was but luck that led to him being correct.
This over again shows that the tripartite definition of knowledge is not sufficient.
Alternative definitions of noesis
Gettier cases are a devastating problem for the tripartite definition of knowledge.
In response, philosophers have tried to come up upwardly with new definitions of cognition that avoid Gettier cases.
Mostly, these new definitions seek to refine the justification condition of the tripartite definition. True and belief remain unchanged.
JTB + no false lemmas
The no faux lemmas definition of knowledge aims to strengthen the justification condition of the tripartite definition.
It says that James has knowledge of P if:
- P is true
- James believes that P
- James's belief is justified
- James did not infer that P from annihilation false
So, basically, it adds an actress status to the tripartite definition. It says cognition is justified truthful belief + that is non inferred from anything false (a false lemma).
This avoids the issues of Gettier cases because Smith's belief "the human who will get the chore has x coins in his pocket" is inferred from the false lemma "Jones volition get the chore".
Remember:
- The tripartite definition says Smith's conventionalities is knowledge, even though it isn't
- The no faux lemmas response says Smith's conventionalities is not knowledge, which is right.
Then, in this instance, the no false lemmas definition appears to be a more than accurate account of knowledge than the tripartite view: it avoids maxim Gettier cases count equally knowledge.
Problem: fake befouled county
However, the no false lemmas definition of cognition faces a similar problem: the fake barn county situation:
- In 'fake barn county', the locals create imitation barns that look identical to real barns
- Henry is driving through fake barn county, just he doesn't know the locals do this
- Henry oft thinks "in that location'due south a barn" when he looks at the fake barns
- These beliefs are non knowledge, because they are not true – the barns are simulated
- Nevertheless, on i occasion Henry looks at the one real befouled and thinks "there's a barn"
- This fourth dimension the belief is truthful
- It'southward besides justified by his visual perception of the befouled
- And information technology's not inferred from anything fake.
According to the no false lemmas definition, Henry's belief is noesis.
Simply this shows that the no false lemmas definition must be false. Henry'southward belief is clearly non knowledge – he'southward only lucky in this case.
Reliabilism
Reliabilism says James knows that P if:
- P is true
- James believes that P
- James's belief that P is caused by a reliable method
A reliable method is one that produces a high per centum of true behavior.
So, if you accept good eyesight, it'south probable that your eyesight would establish a reliable method of forming true behavior. If yous have an accurate memory, it'south likely your retentiveness would likewise be a reliable method for forming true behavior.
Only if you form a belief through an unreliable method – for instance by just guessing – and so information technology would not count every bit noesis fifty-fifty if the resultant conventionalities is truthful.
Children and Animals
An advantage of reliabilism is that information technology allows for young children and animals to take knowledge. Typically, we attribute knowledge to young children and animals. For example, it seems perfectly sensible to say that a seagull knows where to find food or that a baby knows when its mother is speaking.
However, pretty much all the other definitions of knowledge considered hither imply that animals and young children tin can non have knowledge. For example, a seagull or a baby can't justify its beliefs and and then justified true conventionalities rules out seagulls and young babies from having knowledge. Similarly, if virtue epistemology is the correct definition, it is hard to see how a seagull or a newly born baby could possess intellectual virtues of care almost forming true beliefs and thus possess cognition.
However, both young children and animals are capable of forming beliefs via reliable processes, e.g. their eyesight, and and so according to reliabilism are capable of possessing cognition.
Trouble: fake befouled county
You lot can argue against reliabilism using the same fake barn canton argument above: Henry'south true conventionalities that "there'due south a befouled" is acquired by a reliable cognitive process – his visual perception. Reliabilism would thus (incorrectly) say that Henry knows "there's a befouled" fifty-fifty though his belief is only true every bit a result of luck.
Virtue epistemology
At that place are several forms of virtue epistemology (we volition await at two), only mutual to all virtue epistemology definitions of knowledge is a link between a belief and intellectual virtues. Intellectual virtues are somewhat coordinating to the sort of moral virtues considered in Aristotle's virtue theory in moral philosophy. However, instead of existence concerned with moral good, intellectual virtues are nigh epistemic good. For example, an intellectually virtuous person would have traits such as beingness rational, caring about what's truthful, and a expert memory.
Linda Zagzebski: What is Knowledge?
Formula for creating Gettier-style cases
Philosopher Linda Zagzebski argues that definitions of knowledge of the kind we have looked at so far (i.e. 'true belief + some third condition') will always fall victim to Gettier-style cases. She provides a formula for constructing such Gettier cases to defeat these definitions:
- Start with a situation where there is a conventionalities that fits the definition ('true belief + some third condition') but is false due to bad luck
- East.g. Henry's belief "there's a barn" when he is looking at the false barns
- And then change the situation to i where the belief fits that definition ('true belief + some tertiary status') but is true due to good luck
- Eastward.thou. Henry's belief "there's a barn" when he is looking at the one existent barn
- In the second case, the conventionalities will still fit the definition ('true conventionalities + some third condition') because it basically the same every bit the first case
- But the second case won't be knowledge, considering it's only true due to luck
Zagzebski argues that this formula volition ever provide a ways to defeat any definition of knowledge that takes the grade 'truthful conventionalities + some 3rd status' (whether that third condition is justification, formed by a reliable process, or whatsoever).
The reason for this is that truth and the third condition are simply added together, but not linked. The fact that truth and the third condition are not linked leaves a gap where lucky cases can incorrectly fit the definition.
Zagzebski's definition of knowledge
The issues resulting from the gap between truth and the third condition motivate Zagzebski to practice away with the 'truth' status altogether. Instead, Zagzebski'due south analysis of knowledge is that James knows that P if:
- James believes that P
- James's conventionalities that P arises from an human activity of intellectual virtue
Nonetheless, in Zagzebski's assay of knowledge, the 'truth' of the belief is kind of implied by the idea of an act of intellectual virtues. This can be shown by drawing a comparison with moral virtue:
An act of moral virtue is ane where the player both intends to do good and achieves that goal. For example, intending to help an old lady across the road but killing her in the process is not an act of moral virtue because it doesn't achieve a virtuous goal (despite the virtuous intent). Also, helping the old lady across the road considering you think she volition requite you coin is non an act of moral virtue – even though information technology succeeds in achieving a virtuous goal – because your intentions aren't skilful.
Intellectual virtue is similar: Yous must both have the correct motivation (e.g. you lot want to find the truth) and succeed as a result of that virtue (i.e. your belief turns out to exist true because you acted virtuously).
Virtues motivate us to pursue what is good. In the case of knowledge, skilful knowledge is also true. Secondly, virtues enable u.s.a. to achieve our goals (in the same way a virtuous i.due east. practiced knife enables yous to cut) and then intellectual virtues would enable you to reliably form true beliefs.
Sosa's virtue epistemology
Another, more traditional, virtue epistemology definition of knowledge would be:
- P is truthful
- James believes that P
- James'south truthful conventionalities that P is a upshot of James exercising his intellectual virtues
Philosopher Ernest Sosa illustrates the meaning of this last condition with the post-obit archery illustration: He says that a virtuous shot in archery has the post-obit three properties:
- Accurate, i.e. information technology hits the target
- Adroit, i.e. the archer is skilful and shoots the arrow well
- Apt, i.e. the pointer striking the target because it was shot well
This last status – aptness – differentiates Sosa's understanding of knowledge from those criticised by Zagzebski. According to Sosa, for something to authorize as knowledge the conventionalities must be true as a directly outcome of the laic exercising their intellectual virtues – it must exist apt. Aptness provides a link between truth and the third condition that rules out Gettier-way situations where the conventionalities is only true every bit a result of luck.
Returning to the false barn county example, Sosa'due south virtue epistemology could (correctly) say Henry's conventionalities "in that location'south a barn" in false barn county would not qualify as knowledge – despite being true and formed past a reliable method – considering information technology is non apt. Yep, Henry'due south conventionalities is accurate (i.e. true) and adroit (i.e. Henry has good eyesight etc.), just he simply formed the truthful belief equally a result of luck, not considering he used his intellectual virtues.
Trouble: children and animals
Every bit mentioned in more detail in the reliabilism section higher up, a potential criticism of virtue epistemology is that it appears to rule out the possibility of immature children or babies possessing knowledge, despite the fact that they arguably can know many things.
Infallibilism
Infallibilism argues that for a belief to count equally knowledge, information technology must exist truthful and justified in such a fashion as to make it certain.
And so, even though Smith has skillful reasons for his beliefs in the Gettier example, they're non good enough to provide certainty. Certainty, to philosophers like Descartes, ways the impossibility of dubiety.
In the Gettier case, Smith might take misheard the interviewer say he was going to requite Jones the job. Or, even more than farthermost, Smith might be a brain in a vat and Jones may not even exist! Either of these scenarios – however unlikely – enhance the possibility of uncertainty.
Problem: likewise strict
And then, infallibilism correctly says Smith'due south belief in the Gettier case does not count as knowledge.
But it too says pretty much everything fails to authorize equally knowledge!
"I know that h2o boils at 100°c" – tin this be doubted? Of course it tin can! Your scientific discipline teachers might take been lying to you, you lot might have misread your thermometer, yous might be a encephalon in a vat and at that place's no such affair equally water!
Pretty much any belief tin be doubted, as Descartes demonstrates in his three waves of doubt.
So, whereas Gettier cases testify the tripartite definition to ready the bar as well low for knowledge, infallibilism sets the bar mode besides loftier – barely anything can be known!
Knowledge from Perception>>>
Source: https://philosophyalevel.com/aqa-philosophy-revision-notes/definition-of-knowledge/
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